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Myth Boxes
The "Legal" Myth and the "Political" Reality
Earlier in this chapter we noted that one of the alternatives facingthe Constitution's framers was to create a unitary government similar tothe one in England. We also noted that, in the United States, localgovernments owe their legal existence to the state governments thatcreate them. In that sense, each of our state governments is an exampleof a unitary system. Legally, it is the state government thatcreates—and can change or eliminate—local governments. Under such asystem, one would expect local governments to follow the lead of thestate governments, or at least to closely cooperate with stategovernment leaders in solving problems and dealing with the nationalgovernment.
Classifying state governments as unitary, however, often seems morelike a legal myth than a reflection of the political realities of stateand local government relations. In practical terms, local governmentscan and have acted quite independently of state officials in manyarenas. For example, the mayors of large cities such as New York,Chicago, Los Angeles, or Atlanta are often fighting with governors orstate legislators for more funds or less interference in local affairs.Even the members of small local school boards engage in tugs of war withleaders in the state capitol.
A clearer mirror of the political reality of state-local relations isthe struggle between representatives from state and local governmentsfor federal funds. Such a confrontation developed over President Bush'sWar on Drugs. Declared with great fanfare in September 1989, the War onDrugs called for new efforts and innovative tactics to be used in thefight against spreading drug abuse. The amount of money involved wasconsiderable—by some estimates, as much as $9.2 billion. Although agood portion of those funds would be spent on national drug enforcementprograms, at least $2.2 billion would be allocated through grants tostate and local programs.
How and to whom those grants would be awarded became a major issue byNovember 1989. A 1986 antidrug grant-in-aid program had funneled $1.2billion to the states and left it to state officials to distribute fundsto local governments. That approach did not prove extremely popularamong the nation's mayors, and they began writing to the White House andCongress to ask for changes in the grant system. John O. Nordquist, themayor of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, wrote to President Bush arguing that "thecities are where this fight is being waged and where these sourcesshould be directed." Urging more direct funding of his city's antidrugprograms, Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles told Congress that "whatreally matters to the foot soldiers in this war is how manyreinforcements will arrive—and how soon."
The nation's governors, however, did not want to give up the pursestrings. Some of them pointed out that drug abuse problems are notconfined to the cities; they are statewide and demand statewide efforts.Others stressed the administrative efficiency of coordinating drug warefforts within each state. Still others noted that if the war was to bewon, money would have to be spent on prisons, education programs, andtreatment facilities—all typically state responsibilities.
Thus, as Congress and the White House considered how to wage thenewly declared drug war, representatives of both state and localgovernments pressure them to design the program in particular ways.Intergovernmental lobbies played a major part in these efforts.Through the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities,local officials argued for more direct assistance to local programs.Representatives of the National Criminal Justice Association and theNational Governors' Association took up the cudgels for the states. Noone observing the intensity of the conflict between these two allianceswould give much credence to the legal myth of unitary state governmentand the cooperation it implies.
Source: Based on material in William F. Schmidt, "Drug War FundsArouse Conflict," New York Times, November 12, 1989, pp. 1,36.
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