The beginnings of the Cold War were characterized by move and countermove by the two great powers. Was a Cold War inevitable? The Progressives of 1948 certainly didn't think so. And the Cold War revisionist school of historical writing was unwilling to lay the burden entirely on the Russians. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has had to reconsider its 1950s fears of communist power and influence. A lecture dealing with the history of the Cold War, including the revisionist school and more contemporary views, will do much to encourage appreciation of the difficulties of learning the truth. See John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (1972); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1984 (revised edition; 1984); Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order (1991); Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 (1994); Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (1997); Martin Walker, The Cold War: A History (1994); and other excellent suggestions in the chapter bibliography. See also Robert J. Maddox, "The Rise and Fall of Cold War Revisionism," The Historian 46 (May 1984): 416-428.

The Korean War was a war fought for limited objectives, a limited war in a context of containment, a war that required of the American people a willingness to back off from a fight to the finish. The concept of limited war is most unsatisfying for people who wish to conclude what they have begun. Students in American colleges and universities will benefit from a thorough description of the concept and an opportunity to discuss it as a significant aspect of American policy. The instructor may wish to join a lecture on Korea with the discussion suggested in the "Additional Instructional Suggestions" section. David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (1964), has a useful introductory chapter dealing with the concept of limited war. For other helpful citations, see the chapter bibliography as well as the excellent bibliographic essay in Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (1986). William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (1995), is a fine balanced study.

The second Red Scare of the late 1940s and early 1950s deserves close attention. It may be difficult for students to understand how, especially at a time of general prosperity, Americans turned so savagely against the merest hint of disloyalty when that hint might be nothing more than a dissenting viewpoint. The origins of the Red Scare and its growth and development need careful exposition in at least one lecture. David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (1978), is excellent. See also John E. Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace? American Communism and Anticommunism in the Cold War Era (1995).

The instructor may wish to extend consideration of the second Red Scare by developing additional lecture material on several subtopics. One, of course, is the career of Joseph McCarthy. McCarthy's rise and fall is an exemplary story of a demagogue. A second subject is Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs. One was convicted of perjury and the others of conspiracy to commit espionage. Here several questions might be addressed. What, in retrospect, is the certainty of guilt? To what extent were any of them motivated by idealism? How could someone be idealistic about the repressive and authoritarian Soviet society? To what extent was opposition to Hiss and the Rosenbergs motivated by dislike of those born with a silver spoon in their mouth or by anti-Semitism? Still a third topic appropriate for consideration here is the Hollywood Ten. People in the entertainment world have political views as do other Americans, and they also have a platform from which to preach them. Who were the Hollywood Ten? Why were they pilloried? What happened to them? Useful sources for all three subjects are noted in the chapter bibliography under "The Cold War at Home." For McCarthy see also Mark Landis, Joseph McCarthy: The Politics of Chaos (1987), and Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective(1990). It may be noteworthy that when Allen Weinstein began research for his book on the Hiss case, he believed Hiss to be innocent. Ultimately he chose Perjury for his title. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Cold War in 1992, General Dmitri Volkogonov of the Russian military intelligence archives declared that Hiss never spied for the Soviet Union. For Hollywood note that Chapter 7 of David Caute, The Great Fear, deals with show business. Useful lecture material can be mined from Eric Bentley, editor, Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938-1968 (1971).

Harry Truman's reputation has traveled a long road from that of Pendergast machine politician to scrappy can-do leader and cold warrior and then, in many eyes, to statesman. Consult the masterful Truman by David McCullough (1992) and the fine Man of the People: A Life of Harry S Truman by Alonzo L. Hamby (1995).